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This paper defines business and growth rate cycles and describes the importance of key 
coincident  indicators  and reference chronologies, following reflections  on the definition of a 
recession. The robustness of turning point forecasts based on the indicator approach to business 
and growth rate cycles is discussed.  Since  economies undergo structural changes over the 
course of a business cycle,  and rapid structural changes are characteristic of developing 
economies in particular, practical methods for the analysis and prediction of business cycles 
need to be robust to such shifts. The recent Great Recession also underscores why “this time, 
it’s different” should not be considered a valid excuse for forecasting failure. 2 
1. Introduction 
This paper evaluates the robustness of the indicator approach to predicting business and 
growth rate cycles attributed to Geoffrey H. Moore and his associates. The indicator analysis 
technique employs systematic methods of interpreting economic indicators to monitor the pulse 
of the economy as well as to predict future movements in the economy. This approach is based on 
the premise that in a market-oriented economy, in cycle after cycle, economic indicators reach 
turning points in a known sequence. Basically, leading indicators turn before  coincident 
indicators, which turn before lagging indicators.  
One of the earliest systems of this kind was devised shortly before World War I, known 
as the Harvard ABC curves. The A curve represented speculation, more specifically stock prices. 
The B curve denoted business activity, measured by the volume of cheques drawn on bank 
deposits. The C curve represented the money market and was measured by the rate of interest on 
short-term commercial loans. Warren Persons at Harvard University showed that these three 
curves typically moved in sequence – stock prices first, bank debits second, and interest rates last, 
with the lagging movements in interest rates preceding the opposite turns in stock prices. This 
work was continued by researchers at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
founded in 1920 and is discussed in Mitchell and Burns (1938), Burns and Mitchell (1946), 
Moore (1950, 1958, 1961, 1982), Klein (1983),, Zarnowitz (1991), and others. 
Fluctuations in aggregate economic activity, that is, phases of the business cycle, can 
be tracked by using a comprehensive measure of aggregate economic activity. Generally, the 
gross domestic product (GDP) is used since it represents the most aggregate measure of 
economic activity. It is, however, inaccurate to chart the business cycle by this one variable 
alone, since some aspects of the aggregate economy may not be adequately represented in the 
GDP. A better alternative is to construct an index of variables using frequently available 
series that move contemporaneously with the business cycle, typically referred to as a 
coincident index.  
An index of coincident economic indicators is a summary measure designed to track 
fluctuations in aggregate economic activity that make up the business cycle. Thus a 
coincident index can be used to decide the phase of the business cycle the economy is in at a 
given point in time. The index can therefore be used to help determine the timing of 
recessions and expansions as well as speedups and slowdowns in the economy.  
Such a historical chronology is also necessary for designing a system for the 
prediction of recessions and recoveries. Specifically, the selection of leading economic 3 
indicators that anticipate recessions and expansions should be based at least in large part on 
their historical accuracy in predicting them. The measurement of forecasting accuracy, 
however, requires an explicit definition of what is to be forecast. Given the precise historical 
dates when recessions and expansions started, it is possible to decide how well the leading 
indicators predicted them.  
Thus a coincident index is valuable both for understanding the current state of the 
economy and for designing tools for the prediction of business cycles. The leading index, on 
the other hand, combines series that tend to lead at business cycle turns and provides a 
summary measure of what can be expected in the near future. Leading indicators generally 
represent commitments made with respect to future activity or are factors that influence such 
commitments. Whereas the coincident index determines the peaks and troughs of the business 
cycle, the leading index is designed to predict these.  
The real challenge is to identify an approach robust enough to perform well in real 
time under diverse structural conditions in developed and developing economies alike: a way 
to make timely recession calls in fast-changing emerging markets as well as in mature 
economies undergoing material structural changes – whether the recessions are triggered by 
major crises or lesser shocks whose timing is typically unforeseeable.  This is illustrated by 
the recent global recession that motivated the vital question of whether the recession, or the 
crisis associated with it, could have been foreseen. 
The format of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reflects on the nature of business, 
growth and growth rate cycles, the definition of a recession and determination of the 
reference chronologies of business and growth rate cycles. Section 3 gives the reference 
chronologies for countries tracked by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI). Section 
4 discusses the robustness of the indicator approach to predicting business and growth rate 
cycles. The next section reflects on the frequency of recessions expected in the future while 
the last section provides the conclusions and implications.  
 
2.  Business Cycles: Concept and Measurement 
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), formed in 1920 to address 
measurement problems in economics, pioneered research into business cycles. Due to 
NBER’s decades of pioneering work, its basic methodology for business cycle analysis has 
remained a standard for examining fluctuations in business activity (Niemira and Klein, 4 
1994, p.5). It is therefore appropriate to begin the discussion of business cycles with the 
characterization distilled by Wesley C. Mitchell and Arthur F. Burns (1946) from many years 
of research at the NBER: 
“Business cycles are a type of fluctuation found in the aggregate economic activity of nations 
that organize their work mainly in business enterprises: a cycle consists of expansions 
occurring at about the same time in many economic activities, followed by similarly general 
recessions, contractions and revivals which merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle; 
this sequence of changes is recurrent but not periodic; in duration business cycles vary from 
more than one year to ten or twelve years; they are not divisible into shorter cycles of similar 
character with amplitudes approximating their own.” 
What is striking about this definition is the emphasis on the concerted nature of the 
upswings and downswings in different measures of economic activity. In fact, the business 
cycle is a consensus of cycles in many activities, which have a tendency to peak and trough 
around the same time (Niemira and Klein, 1994, p.4). As noted by Moore (1982): 
“No single measure of aggregate economic activity is called for in the definition because 
several such measures appear relevant to the problem, including output, employment, 
income, and trade, and no single measure is either available for a long period or possesses 
all the desired attributes. Quarterly figures for gross national product (GNP) became 
available in the 1940s in the United States and even later, if at all, in other countries. Since 
monthly peak and trough dates are desired, quarterly figures are not sufficient in any case.” 
Moore further notes: 
“Virtually all economic statistics are subject to error, and hence are often revised. Use of 
several measures necessitates an effort to determine what is the consensus among them, but it 
avoids some of the arbitrariness of deciding upon a single measure that perforce could be 
used only for a limited time with results that would be subject to revision every time the 
measure was revised.”    
Furthermore, Zarnowitz and Boschan (1975) point out that some series “prove more 
useful in one set of conditions, others in a different set. To increase the chances of getting 
true signals and reduce those of getting false ones, it is advisable to rely on all such 
potentially useful (series) as a group.” 
Clearly, one significant advantage of analyzing a range of roughly coincident 
macroeconomic series is that almost all such time series are measured with error and are 
often revised, sometimes very significantly. Thus, the existence of such measurement error 5 
alone is strong justification for avoiding reliance on any single macroeconomic time series to 
determine a business cycle chronology. 
However, the motivation for looking at a range of measures other than GDP – 
irrespective of its frequency of measurement – is much more profound than simply allowing 
for measurement error. Rather it involves the essential philosophical question of what should 
constitute ‘aggregate economic activity’, and therefore the business cycle. It  should be 
recognized as being much more than simply a downturn in measured output. Most crucially, 
it must also encompass employment dimensions.  
Thus, analysis of series such as retail sales, industrial production and GDP may be 
regarded as attempts to gauge the current state of demand and output production in the 
economy.  At the same time, the inclusion of series such as household income  and 
employment is explicit recognition of the impact on community welfare of variation in output 
and demand and are therefore very much integral aspects of any business cycle.  Some would 
argue that the inclusion of output measures indirectly captures these latter effects. 
Nevertheless, in different cycles and over the course of any given cycle, the relationship 
between output growth and employment is not very stable or precise. Another clue to what 
was in the minds of Burns and Mitchell is evident in the quote below from Burns (1952): 
And if business cycles are …. a congeries of interrelated phenomena, any distinction 
between the problem of how business cycles run their course and how our economic 
organization works cannot but be artificial. (p. 36) 
And again from Burns (1952): 
To Mitchell a business cycle meant more than a fluctuation in a single aggregate such 
as national income or employment. It also meant that the fluctuation…. is diffused 
through economic activity… appearing, as a rule… in markets for… commodities and 
labor, in processes of saving and investment, in finance as well as in industry and 
commerce. (p. 36) 
Two features of a business cycle emerge from the above discussion. First, a genuine 
business cycle is marked by three “Ps”  (Banerji, 1999).  In other words, movements in 
economic activity have to be pronounced, pervasive, and persistent enough to fall into the 
category of a recession or expansion. Second, a single measure of economic activity cannot 
represent aggregate economic activity. Instead, a composite index of indicators that 
represents current economic activity is needed to identify and measure business cycles. Such 
a composite index is the coincident index that best captures  the  cyclical  upswings and 6 
downswings in economic activity. It represents the synchronous fluctuations in the aggregate 
measures of output, income, employment, and trade (sales). 
What is a Recession?  
It is clear that there is no single adequate measure of economic activity. Furthermore, 
since economic statistics are generally subject to error, evidence from a number of 
independently compiled indicators is expected to be more reliable than from any individual 
series. Despite the advantages of using a composite coincident index, in recent years the 
rigorous definition of the business cycle has increasingly been overshadowed by more 
simplistic shortcuts. Very often, a single adequate measure of economic activity is used to 
date recessions. Perhaps the most popular rule-of-thumb designates a recession as at least two 
successive quarters of decline in the gross domestic product (GDP). Lost in that quest for 
simplicity are the essential characteristics of a recession – that it consists of a pervasive and 
pronounced downswing in a variety of measures of economic activity. Not surprisingly, such 
shortcuts can produce anomalous results. In fact, while two successive quarters of decline in 
GDP  occur in most recessions, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a 
recession (Layton and Banerji, 2003; Dua and Banerji, 1999, 2004, 2007).  
For example, it is well known that in the mid 1970s, Japan experienced its worst 
recession since the Second World War in the aftermath of the jump in oil prices. At the time, 
there were severe and prolonged declines in Japanese industrial production, employment, 
retail sales, and wage and salary income. Yet Japanese GDP plunged in the first quarter of 
1974, rose for the next two quarters, and then dipped again in the fourth quarter, finishing the 
year 2% below its year-ago level, but without satisfying the “two-down-quarters-of-GDP 
rule”.  
In the United States, the NBER officially identified a recession that lasted from 
January to July of 1980. Until 1995, the data showed only one quarter of decline in GDP 
during that period. Only the 1995 switch to chain-weighted GDP data produced two 
successive declines in GDP during that recession, belatedly vindicating the NBER’s original 
decision. Clearly, the popular rule-of-thumb would have delayed the recognition of that 
recession by more than a decade! Also, the official U.S. recession of 1960-61 does not show 
two successive quarters of decline in GDP.  
In the U.S. recession of 2001, initial data showed a GDP decline only in the third quarter 
of 2001 that many ascribed to the events of September 11. Based on this apparent one-quarter 
decline in GDP, some economists, as well as certain high officials in Washington, insisted as late 7 
as July 2002 that there had been no recession at all in 2001, since GDP had not declined for two 
quarters. In late July 2002 – 16 months after the start of the recession – revised data showed that 
GDP had actually declined in each of the first three quarters of 2001, finally silencing denial of 
the recession. However, the latest data revisions indicate that GDP did not show two successive 
quarters of decline during the 2001 recession, though it involved a loss of nearly three million 
jobs – the biggest recessionary job loss in the post-World War II period until that time.  
During the 2007-09 recession, which officially lasted from December 2007 to June 2009, 
GDP data was especially misleading. When the Lehman Brothers collapse triggered a global 
financial crisis in September 2008, nine months into the recession, the GDP data available at the 
time did not show any declines at all, though later revisions do show a decline in GDP in the first 
quarter of 2008. This apparent strength in GDP, along with the widespread and undue reliance on 
GDP as the shorthand method to determine whether the economy was in recession, badly misled 
policymakers. It may be embarrassing to recall in retrospect, but, based on guidance from an 
inflation-obsessed Fed, the U.S. futures markets in June 2008 – six months into the recession – 
were betting on more than a one-percentage-point rate hike by year-end – in the middle of a 
recession!  Since the two-down-quarter “rule” results in such dangerously delayed recession 
recognition, particularly from the point of view of policy makers – as well as changes in the 
verdict even years after the fact – it is both misleading and inadequate.  
In fact, theoretically, a recession is more than a decline in just output (which GDP 
measures) and empirically, the two-quarter GDP decline rule is not a necessary or sufficient 
condition for a recession to occur. Thus, such GDP declines are not always accompanied by 
the pronounced, pervasive, and persistent declines in output, income, employment, and retail 
and wholesale trade that mark a business cycle recession, or the complex processes that are 
the antecedents of a genuine recession. As a result, the symptoms that precede a real 
recession, as captured in the appropriate leading indicators, may not be seen ahead of such a 
mistakenly identified “recession”. Such anomalies can lead not only to an erroneous dating of 
recessions, but also to difficulties in the proper selection of leading indicators of recessions 
and recoveries. 
Thus, in order to predict recessions, it is first necessary to appreciate what they really 
are, and why both the NBER and ECRI determine business cycle dates on the basis of the 
broad measures of output, employment, income and sales.  
Under certain circumstances, when spending falls, for instance, it triggers cascading 
declines in output, and consequently in employment and in income, which results in falling 8 
sales, which in turn feeds back into a further fall in output, and so on, all the while spreading 
from industry to industry, region to region, and, of course, indicator to indicator. At some 
point in time, the vicious cycle switches to a virtuous cycle, in which rising output, for 
example, leads to higher employment, income and sales, feeding back into even higher 
output, and so on, resulting in a self-sustaining expansion. Thus, a recession is a vicious 
cycle of pronounced, pervasive and persistent cascading declines in output, income, 
employment and sales, eventually giving way to an expansion, which is an analogous 
virtuous cycle of rising economic activity. The transitions between the vicious and virtuous 
cycles are the peaks and troughs in the cycle, also known as cyclical turning points.  
The business cycle peak is the point in time when the virtuous cycle switches to a 
vicious cycle, while the business cycle trough marks the transition from a vicious cycle to a 
virtuous cycle. Thus, those dates are determined on the basis of a carefully determined 
consensus among the specific measures of aggregate economic activity constituting the 
feedback loop – not GDP or employment alone.  
Classical Cycles, Growth Cycles, and Growth Rate Cycles  
The above discussion describes “classical” business cycles that measure the ups and 
downs of the economy on the basis of the absolute levels of the key coincident indicators 
involved in recessionary vicious cycles and expansionary virtuous circles. A second 
definition of fluctuations in economic activity, termed a growth cycle, traces the ups and 
downs through deviations of the actual growth rate of the economy from its long-run trend 
rate of growth. In other words, a speedup (slowdown) in economic activity means a sustained 
period of growth higher (lower) than the long-run trend rate of growth.  
Pronounced, pervasive and persistent economic slowdowns begin with reduced but 
still-positive growth rates and can eventually develop into recessions. The high-growth phase 
coincides with the business cycle recovery and the early phase of the expansion, while the 
low-growth phase corresponds to the later phase of the expansion, in the later stages leading 
to recession. Some slowdowns, however, continue to exhibit positive growth rates and 
culminate in renewed expansions, not recessions. As a result, all classical cycles associate 
with growth cycles, but not all growth cycles associate with classical cycles. Growth cycle 
chronologies based on trend-adjusted measures of economic activity were first developed by 
Mintz (1969, 1972, 1974). Burns and Mitchell noted the following about growth cycles: 
If secular trends were eliminated at the outset as fully as are seasonal variations, they 
would show that business cycles are a more pervasive and a more potent factor in 9 
economic life... For when the secular trend of a series rises rapidly, it may offset the 
influence of cyclical contractions in general business, or make the detection of this 
influence difficult. In such instances [the classical business cycle method] may 
indicate lapses from conformity to contractions in general business, which would not 
appear if the secular trend were removed. 
Growth cycle analysis also formed the basis for the international economic indicators 
(IEI) project started by Philip Klein and Geoffrey Moore at the NBER in the early 1970s. 
Following the work  of Mintz,  as well as Klein and Moore, when the OECD developed 
leading indicators for its member countries in the 1980s it decided to specifically focus on 
growth cycles.  
Of course, growth cycles, measured in terms of deviations from trend, necessitated the 
determination of the trend of the time series being analyzed. The Phase Average Trend 
(PAT), calculated by averaging business cycle phases, was used as the best trend measure by 
the OECD as well as in the IEI project, in order to measure growth cycles. However, one 
problem with the PAT (Boschan and Ebanks, 1978) as a benchmark for growth cycles is that 
it is subject to frequent and occasionally significant revisions, especially near the end of the 
series. While the OECD has recently switched from the PAT to the Hodrick-Prescott trend, 
this does not solve the problem of regular revisions of the trend estimates.  
In other words, while growth cycles are not hard to identify in a historical time series, 
it is difficult to measure them accurately on a real-time basis (Boschan and Banerji, 1990). 
This is because the trend over the latest year or two is not accurately known and must be 
estimated, but the PAT estimates tend to be very unstable near the end (Cullity and Banerji, 
1996). More generally, any measure of the most recent trend is necessarily an estimate and 
subject to revisions, so it is difficult to come to a precise determination of growth cycle dates, 
at least in real time.   
This difficulty makes growth cycle analysis less than ideal as a tool for the real-time 
monitoring and forecasting of economic cycles, even though it may be useful for the purposes 
of historical analysis. This is one reason that by the late 1980s, Moore had started moving 
towards the use of growth rate cycles for the measurement of series which manifested few 
actual cyclical declines, but did show cyclical slowdowns.  
Growth rate cycles are simply the cyclical upswings and downswings in the growth 
rate of economic activity. The growth rate used is the "six-month smoothed growth rate" 
concept, initiated by Moore to eliminate the need for the sort of extrapolation of the past 10 
trend needed in growth cycle analysis. This smoothed growth rate is based on the ratio of the 
latest month's figure to its average over the preceding 12 months (and therefore centered 
about six months before the latest month). Unlike the more commonly used 12-month 
change, it is not very sensitive to any idiosyncratic occurrences 12 months earlier. A number 
of such advantages make the six-month smoothed growth rate a useful concept in cyclical 
analysis (Banerji, 1999). Cyclical turns in this growth rate define the growth rate cycle.  
The growth rate cycle is related to Mintz’s earlier work on the “step cycle” except 
that the former is based on the smoothed growth rate as mentioned above. Also, in concept, 
the growth rate cycle does not suggest that the growth rate passes through “high growth” and 
“low growth” steps, but moves, instead, from cyclical troughs to cyclical peaks and back 
again. At ECRI, which was founded by Moore, growth rate cycles rather than growth cycles 
are used as the primary tool to monitor international economies in real time. The growth rate 
cycle is, in effect, a second way to monitor slowdowns in contrast to downturns. Because of 
the difference in definition, growth rate cycles are different from growth cycles. Thus, what 
has emerged in recent years is the recognition that business cycles, growth cycles and growth 
rate cycles all need to be monitored in a complementary fashion. However, of the three, 
business cycles and growth rate cycles are more suitable for real-time monitoring and 
forecasting, while growth cycles are more suitable for historical analysis (Klein, 1998). The 
relationship between business cycles and growth rate cycles is illustrated in Figure 1.  
What makes all these kinds of cycles valid units of analysis is that they all exhibit the 
key hallmark of cyclical behavior, which is the cyclical co-movement in many different 
economic activities. It is the near-simultaneous peaks and troughs in the broad measures of 
output, income, employment and sales, whether in terms of levels, deviations from trend or 
growth rates, that characterise economic cycles.   
In sum, the absolute  level of a coincident index helps date turning points in the 
classical business cycle while the smoothed growth rate of the coincident index measures the 
highs and lows of the growth rate cycle, or the speedups and slowdowns in the economy. 
Both are suitable for tracking the economy in real time. On the other hand, a leading index is 
a predictive tool to gauge if and when a recession or expansion may take place. The growth 
rate of the leading index is a harbinger of speedups and slowdowns in the economy. The 
relationship between the coincident and leading index is shown in Figure 2. 
Determination of Turning Points and Dating Business and Growth Rate Cycles 11 
The choice of turning points is made by mechanical procedures supplemented by 
rules of thumb and experienced judgment, starting with an objective alhorithm developed at 
the NBER (see Bry and Boschan, 1971). The rules embodied in this procedure trace their 
roots to Burns and Mitchell (1946) and continue to be applied by ECRI. Finally, turning 
points must pass muster through the experienced judgment of the researcher. A specific 
cycle, that is, a set of turning points for each series, is thus obtained.  
A reference cycle chronology is then determined based on the consensus  of the 
individual turning points in a set of coincident economic indicators. A reference cycle based 
on the levels of the coincident indicators thus gives the consensus of turning points of the 
coincident indicators. Apart from dating the recessions, this reference cycle serves as a 
benchmark to evaluate  leading indicators and their historical leads. The reference cycle 
derived from growth rates of the coincident indicators gives the highs and lows of the growth 
rate cycle. This dates the slowdowns and the speedups in economic activity.  
 
3.  Reference Chronologies  
ECRI has tracked 19 countries over a long period of time. These include  the 
following: U.S., Canada, Mexico, Germany, France, U.K., Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, 
Austria, Japan, China, India, Korea, Australia, Taiwan, New Zealand and South Africa. It has 
also recently added Brazil to its list.  
ECRI has established the recession start dates for almost all the economies it tracks 
that were recently in recession. Table 1 on Business Cycle Chronologies provides recession 
dates for the countries covered by ECRI, using the same approach used by the NBER to 
determine the official U.S. recession dates. This dating reveals an interesting sequence with 
respect to the recent global recession. Italy led the way, entering recession in August 2007, 
followed by New Zealand in November and the U.S. in December 2007. In February 2008, 
Japan, Taiwan, France and Spain fell simultaneously into recession, followed by Germany 
and Sweden in April, U.K. in May, Korea in July, and Brazil in August 2008. 
The dates for the onset of the latest recession in various economies highlight the 
reality that the global contraction was highly concerted and that the decoupling hypothesis 
had been misguided. It is noteworthy, however, that both China and India did not experience 
a recession, but a milder counterpart called a slowdown, meaning a downshift in the pace of 
positive growth in economic activity. A recession, on the other hand, would have been more 12 
severe, involving a vicious cycle of pronounced, pervasive and persistent cascading declines 
in output, income, employment and sales, which both countries escaped. ECRI’s growth rate 
cycle chronologies are given in Table 2.  
While it makes sense to develop leading indicator systems using such reference 
chronologies as benchmarks, it is highly inadvisable to try to take “shortcuts” by relying on 
alternative, more simplistic recession “definitions”, especially those based on GDP alone, 
such as “two down quarters of GDP” – which, as we have discussed, is an invalid definition 
of recession, despite its popularity, even among economists. As we have demonstrated, such 
misconceptions have resulted in serious policy errors that are subsequently obscured by data 
revisions. The reality is that properly-determined cycle chronologies form the essential basis 
for the development of reliable leading indicator systems, and simplistic shortcuts, such as 
the use of GDP as the sole arbiter of recessions and recoveries, can result in a very shaky and 
unreliable foundation for the development of economic indicator systems. Of course, because 
these reference chronologies constitute the very “target” that leading indicators should be 
designed to predict, a misconceived target can fatally undermine the integrity and accuracy of 
a leading indicator system developed on that basis. Thus, we cannot overemphasise the 
importance of developing proper reference chronologies.  
Having defined recessions, slowdowns and the corresponding reference chronologies 
across economies on a uniform basis, we can proceed to the issue of testing for robustness. 
That is the true test of the worth of any recession forecasting approach.  
 
4.  Predicting Turning Points 
The sheer severity of the Great Recession for many developed economies – most 
importantly the United States – motivates the vital question of whether the recession, or the 
crisis that triggered it, could have been foreseen. The crisis itself, while highly damaging and 
unusually widespread in this era of globalization, actually shared key characteristics with past 
crises.  Yet, hardly anybody who correctly foresaw the crisis also predicted when  the 
recession would arrive. Rather, they kept warning of calamity – often for years – until they 
were vindicated. In other words, even if they were correct about the big picture, they were 
generally wrong about recession timing. After all, the true test of a forecasting approach is its 
ability to predict whether – and if so, when – an actual recession will begin.  13 
Consensus forecasts performed poorly, but no worse than usual, in predicting the 
latest recession. Figure 3 shows how forecasts (consensus and individual) can easily miss 
turning points. Since consensus forecasts are known to be among the most accurate, that is a 
sad commentary on the general accuracy of recession forecasting. Yet it merely confirms the 
conclusion of the IMF’s 63-country study from nearly a decade ago (Loungani, 2001) that 
“the record of failure to predict recessions is virtually unblemished.”  
Thus, the real challenge is not to identify the best model to predict recessions ex post 
in a specific economy over a given time frame, but to identify those approaches that were 
robust enough to perform well in real time under diverse structural conditions: a way to make 
timely recession calls in fast-changing emerging markets as well as in mature economies 
undergoing material structural changes – whether the recessions are triggered by major crises 
or lesser shocks whose timing is typically unforeseeable.  
In the United States, the Great Recession marked a structural break from the Great 
Moderation lasting from the mid-1980s to the eve of that recession. The Great Moderation, in 
turn, represented a structural change from earlier, more volatile cyclical patterns. The U.S. 
may now be on the cusp of a new era with very different cyclical characteristics – once again 
demanding forecasting tools that can keep functioning under changing conditions. Thus, it 
would do little good to develop models optimized on the basis of past performance if the 
future is likely to be quite different. Quite simply, structural change, rapid or gradual, is 
integral to the evolution of both developing and developed economies, and is therefore likely 
to have important implications for business cycles in the decade ahead. Real-time forecasting 
failure cannot therefore always be blamed on “parameter drift” or “this time, it’s different,” 
as an excuse for forecast error.  
An actionable recession-forecasting approach must thus be a robust one, capable of 
making timely recession and recovery calls in spite of structural changes, in developed and 
developing economies alike, whether triggered by major crises or smaller shocks. As we shall 
see, this is far from an impossible dream.  
Geoffrey H. More: Father of Leading Indicators 
Geoffrey H. Moore started his six-decade career in the late 1930s, when he joined his 
mentors Wesley C. Mitchell and Arthur F. Burns at the NBER in New York. Building on 
their 1938 work on “leading indicators of cyclical revival”, Moore established the very first 
list of “leading indicators of cyclical revival and recession” – i.e., leading indicators as we 14 
know them today. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, he developed the composite index 
method with Julius Shiskin, with whom he also created the original index of leading 
economic indicators.  
In order to extend his leading indicator systems beyond U.S. borders, Moore had to 
first establish cyclical turning point dates for the different economies as objective 
benchmarks to test whether the indicators actually led those turning points. Of course, he had 
decades of experience doing this: before there was a Business Cycle Dating Committee, 
Moore determined the U.S. business cycle dates almost single-handedly on the NBER’s 
behalf from 1947 to 1978, with a short break when he was on assignment in Washington in 
1969 to 1973. When he retired, the NBER created the formal Business Cycle Dating 
Committee, of which he remained a member until his death ten years ago.  
Moore established ECRI to preserve and advance the tradition of business cycle 
research he and his colleagues had pioneered at the NBER, which veered off in a completely 
different direction after Moore’s retirement. Naturally, ECRI long ago began to establish 
historical recession dates for economies other than the U.S., using the longstanding NBER 
approach. ECRI has long maintained these business cycle chronologies, which function as 
historical references for 20-odd economies, including China, India and Brazil, as described in 
the previous section. These recession dates serve as objective benchmarks for determining 
recession-forecasting performance. A discussion of the definition of recession is given in the 
previous section and in Layton and Banerji (2003). 
An Answer to “Measurement Without Theory” 
It is important to understand the process followed by Moore in selecting the first 
leading indicators of recession and recovery. Based on decades of prior business cycle 
research covering many economies, Moore and his colleagues already had a clear concept of 
the main drivers of business cycles. If those were indeed the prime movers of business cycles, 
the natural next step was to identify related time series where the early signs of a turn in the 
cycle should potentially first appear.  
Only after developing this initial shortlist of economic indicators –  based not on 
empirical fit but on an understanding of business cycle theory – did Moore move on to 
examine the empirical record of their behavior at business cycle peaks and troughs. This 
empirical testing – based on U.S. data from 1870 to 1938 – determined the final selection of 
Moore’s 1950 list of leading indicators of recession and recovery.  15 
Contrary to the impression created by the well-known Koopmans (1947) critique of 
“measurement without theory,” this entire process was rooted in business cycle theory: not in 
falsifiable statistical models, to be sure, but in a theoretical, conceptual understanding of the 
drivers of the business cycle, nevertheless. Empirical testing played only a secondary role in 
this process. This was far from a data-mining approach.  
Nearly half a century later, Moore asked the question: we know that the original 
leading indicators anticipated both recessions and recoveries in the late 19
th and early 20
th 
centuries, but what have they done for us lately? He tested their “out-of-sample” 
performance, so to say, in the second half of the 20
th century. The results, according to 
Moore, provided a fitting answer to the old charge that the methods of Mitchell, Burns, 
Moore and their NBER colleagues amounted to “measurement without theory”. We recently 
completed a similar analysis stretching from the mid-20
th  century through the early 21
st 
century, including the Great Recession. The results are worth recounting.  
The original empirical criteria  used by Moore in selecting the leading indicators 
focused on their ability to lead U.S. business cycle peaks and troughs before World War II. 
Our results showed that the cyclical peaks and troughs in same original leading indicators 
(determined on the basis of the Bry-Boschan algorithm) continued to lead U.S. business cycle 
turning points in the post-World War II period as well. But we went further.  
We gathered data on the same indicators, or their closest equivalents, in all the Group 
of Seven (G7) developed economies other than the U.S. in the postwar period (specifically, 
Japan, Germany, U.K., France, Italy and Canada). Remarkably, when we compared their 
turning points with the respective business cycle chronologies established independently by 
ECRI on the same basis as in the U.S., their performance held up. In fact, the average lead 
time was slightly longer than in the U.S.  
Next, we conducted a similar analysis, but on the basis of growth rate cycles (which 
some call acceleration-deceleration cycles, consisting of alternating cyclical upswings and 
downswings in economic growth) rather than classical business cycles. We found that the 
growth rates of the same leading indicators continued to lead the respective growth rate cycle 
turning points, which had been determined independently by ECRI for all the G7 economies. 
These results are summarized in Figure 4.  
In the early 1990s, Moore’s original analysis had reached analogous conclusions for a 
slightly different group of countries when testing the same indicators on the basis of growth 
cycles (also called deviation cycles, consisting of alternating periods of above-trend and 16 
below-trend economic growth). Once again, their findings emphasized the durability of these 
leading indicators in terms of their ability to lead at cyclical turning points.  
We also constructed a composite leading index out of Moore’s original list of U.S. 
leading indicators. That leading index covers 107 years and 21 recessions, including the 
1907-08 and 1920-21 depressions, the entire period of the Great Depression, and the more 
recent Great Moderation. Again, no data fitting was involved in creating the index.  
So how did this Index of Original Leading Indicators (IOLI) perform during the Great 
Recession, which caught so many by surprise? As a matter of record, it peaked in July 2007, 
five months before the official December 2007 U.S. business cycle peak. It subsequently 
troughed in March 2009, three months before the June 2009 U.S.  business cycle trough.  
What we have, then, is strong evidence of the robustness of the original leading 
indicators of recession and recovery –  across time and space, as well as three different 
definitions of economic cycles. At a juncture when so many of the “scientific” statistical 
models appear to have failed in their forecasts, strongly refutes  the widely accepted but 
unwarranted old charge that classical business cycle analysis amounts  to “measurement 
without theory”.  In fact, in the absence of sound theoretical underpinnings, it would be 
astonishing indeed to see a display of such robustness in a set of forecasting tools.  
Testing for Significance 
Given these results, most economists might be sorely tempted to conduct “scientific” 
statistical tests on these leading indicators. In fact, they may wonder why we have not 
conducted such tests ourselves.  
The key reason is our caution about using such tests, which is justified by an old 
admonition from Granger and Newbold (1986) that many prefer to overlook: A leading index 
“is intended only to forecast the timing of turning points and not the size of the forthcoming 
downswing or upswing nor to be a general indicator of the economy at times other than near 
turning points. Because of this, (its) evaluation … by standard statistical techniques is not 
easy”.  
In other words, the evaluation of a leading index should be based purely on whether 
its cyclical peaks lead business cycle peaks, and whether its cyclical troughs lead business 
cycle troughs. So how well does the IOLI perform at turning points?  
Over its 107-year span, the IOLI exhibits a median lead of 4.5 months at U.S. 
business cycle peaks and three months at business cycle troughs, leading at 93% of business 17 
cycle turning points. In the “out-of-sample” postwar period, the statistics are quite similar 
(perhaps slightly better): the IOLI has a median lead of six months at business cycle peaks 
and three months at business cycle troughs, leading at 91% of business cycle turning points.  
Based on this historical record, while avoiding standard statistical tests in accordance 
with Granger and Newbold’s warning, we can still use a non-standard, non-parametric 
statistical test to evaluate the significance of the IOLI’s leads at business cycle turning points. 
The resultant Lead Profiles (Banerji, 2000) show, at a 99% confidence level, that the IOLI 
has a lead of at least three months at both business cycle peaks and troughs; at a 95% 
confidence level, they also show that the IOLI has a lead of at least four months at business 
cycle peaks. The IOLI’s lead of five months at the 2007 business cycle peak and around three 
months at the 2009 business cycle trough is very much in line with this historical record.  
The point is not that this is the best possible leading index or that these lead times are 
especially long. In fact, based on six decades of research since Moore’s identification of the 
original leading list of indicators of revival and recession, ECRI has developed an 
international array of specialized leading indexes (Banerji and Hiris, 2001) that number well 
over a hundred, and serve as the basis for ECRI’s turning point forecasts.  
The real value of the IOLI’s lead is as testimony to its remarkable robustness and 
“out-of-sample” performance: after all, its leads at the peak and trough of the Great 
Recession were not that different from those at the peak and trough of the 1907-08 depression 
more than a century ago. The century since that depression has seen remarkable changes in 
the U.S. business cycle – and the IOLI continued to function very well through all of those 
structural shifts. What the IOLI provides is really a proof of concept. That is the key 
takeaway from over a century of leading indicator data (Banerji, 2010).  
This property of robustness must be an essential feature of good real-time forecasts. 
This is even more relevant today since there is reason to believe that we are about to see 
further changes to the contours of the U.S. business cycle.  
 
5. More Frequent Recessions Ahead? 
In the summer of 2008, before the Lehman Brothers debacle, all the major developed 
economies were already in recession. While recognizing that reality, ECRI researchers also 
uncovered a longstanding pattern of falling trend growth in successive past U.S. expansions, 18 
beginning at least as far back as the 1970s. This did not bode well for the expansion that 
would follow (U.S. Cyclical Outlook, 2008).  
This pattern was evident across all of the broad coincident indicators that determine 
the start and end dates of business cycles. In fact, the last (2001-07) U.S. expansion exhibited 
the lowest trend growth of any U.S. expansion on record – in terms of not only GDP and 
industrial production, but also employment, income and sales (Figure 5). If this pattern of 
falling growth in successive expansions remained intact, the next expansion would likely be 
even slower.  
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the U.S. economy fell 
off a cliff. Evidently, the Great Moderation was over. By January 2009, when the New Year 
began, ECRI was  convinced that the Great Moderation would not soon return, and the 
implications had become evident: we had transitioned into an era of heightened cyclical 
volatility, which, along with low trend growth, dictated more frequent recessions 
(International Cyclical Outlook, 2009).  
Why did ECRI not believe in the return of the Great Moderation? Its logic was rooted 
in the very explanations that had been proffered in earlier years to explain the Great 
Moderation. The main explanations had been: 1) better supply chain management systems, 
leading to milder inventory cycles; 2) more skilled monetary policy; and 3) luck.  
Though there was certainly some evidence to support the contention that milder 
inventory cycles had helped to reduce cyclical volatility, its obituary had already been written 
a decade ago, the summer before the September 11 attacks. Surveying the devastation that 
followed the popping of the Information Technology bubble, Stephen Cecchetti (2001) had 
written: “How ironic that the producers of the equipment that was to have eliminated the 
inventory cycle are themselves its foremost victims.” During the Great Recession, apparently 
disregarding the virtues of better supply chain management, the inventory cycle returned with 
a vengeance, thanks largely to the Bullwhip Effect, which refers to the amplification of 
cyclical fluctuations up the supply chain. This is increasingly relevant because international 
sourcing has grown rapidly since the end of the cold war, with all major economies becoming 
far more export-dependent than before.  
As for the thesis that the Great Moderation was all about skilled monetary policy, the 
less said the better. The timing of monetary policy, especially in the lead-up to the crisis, 
surely left much to be desired.  19 
Finally, the luck factor is certainly relevant. For one thing, unusually in the 1990s, the 
major economies took turns falling into recession, starting with the “English-speaking 
recession” in 1990-92, followed by recession in continental Europe and Japan in 1992-94, 
and a renewed Japanese recession in 1997-99, along with deep recessions in Asia following 
the Asian crisis. Thus, there was almost always some slack in the global markets during the 
decade, strengthening disinflationary forces during much of the 1990s –  the decade that 
dominated the period of the Great Moderation. Also, the end of the cold war and the 
integration of the ex-Soviet economies, along with China and India, into the global market 
economy, produced unprecedented deflationary forces that helped foster a period of non-
inflationary growth with reduced need for Fed intervention. In sum, it does appear that luck 
may have played a key role in sustaining the Great Moderation. However, those forces are 
hardly likely to be replicated in the decade ahead – especially when Chinese wages are rising 
rapidly and commodity prices are trending upward.  
Long expansions tend to occur when cyclical volatility falls, the economy’s trend rate 
of growth increases, or both. Of course, the 2001-07 expansion, as discussed, saw the slowest 
pace of growth among all postwar expansions. It is only the relatively low cyclical volatility 
seen during the 2001-07 business cycle that kept the expansion going as long as six years 
before it succumbed to a cyclical downturn.  
But since the end of that expansion, the U.S. has seen a sharp increase in cyclical 
volatility. If, as we believe, the Great Moderation is not about to stage a comeback, while the 
low trend rate of growth seen in the 2001-07 expansion either persists or declines during the 
current expansion, the U.S. will probably see more frequent recessions in the coming years. 
We cannot presume to be able to foresee all the structural changes that various 
economies, and specifically the U.S., will undergo in the current  decade. However, the 
probable convergence of heightened cyclical volatility and slower trend growth (which 
incidentally also tends to follow financial crises), would generally lead to more frequent 
recessions – quite a different pattern from the period of the Great Moderation, but not a 
replay of the Great Recession either.  
In other words, the decade that has just begun may be sufficiently uncharted territory, 
in terms of the contours of business cycles, to question the wisdom of estimating the 
parameters of conventional econometric models on the basis of data from period of either the 
Great Recession or the Great Moderation – or from even earlier time periods, for that matter. 
Once again, such risks underscore the value of robust approaches to turning point forecasting 20 
in the years ahead. Of course, in rapidly changing emerging markets, the need for such robust 
forecasting systems is self-evident.  
6. Conclusions and Implications  
The foregoing should not be considered to be a substantive recommendation regarding the 
choice of specific leading indicators or models to predict the next recession. Rather, based on 
what has been called “the longest running experiment in economics,” which continues today 
at ECRI, it represents a critical proof of concept, demonstrating just how robust well-selected 
leading indicators can be, even in the face of dramatic structural changes across space and 
time, more of which undoubtedly await us in the years ahead. This finding of robustness of 
the leads of well-selected leading indicators at cycle turning points lies at the foundation of 
ECRI’s approach, providing an ability to make timely recession and recovery calls in real 
time even under changing conditions.  
In order to assess robustness, it is imperative to be able to verify that conceptually 
similar leading indicators work across many economies with varying economic structures 
over long periods of time. This requires uniform benchmarks based on consistent definitions 
of recessions and slowdowns – specifically, reliable business cycle and growth rate cycle 
chronologies, respectively.  
What we have shown is that, when evaluated against those objective cyclical 
benchmarks, the original leading indicators of recession and recovery – selected primarily on 
a conceptual basis – continue to exhibit remarkably robust performance under a wide range 
of conditions in the developed economies. Whether we are faced with the specific likelihood 
of more frequent U.S. recessions, as ECRI’s research suggests, or with unforeseeable changes 
in structural conditions that may shape the next cycle, it is our belief that it would surely be 
prudent to rely on a time-tested, robust approach to business cycle forecasting. In fact, 
ECRI’s long and successful real-time experience in calling recessions and recoveries well 
ahead of consensus testifies to the value of such an approach.  
In developing economies, where structural conditions are quite different from those in 
developed economies – and especially because rapid structural change is part and parcel of 
the development process  –  similar  robust approaches should be considered essential to 
recession forecasting. But that does not mean it is necessarily useful to slavishly copy what 
might work in structurally-different developed economies.  21 
In fact, before assuming that such leading indicator systems would work in 
developing economies that might be at various stages of development, it would be essential to 
verify such a  contention  –  but this can only be done in the context of reliable cycle 
chronologies. In order to properly develop such chronologies, developing economies would 
need to start collecting data on the full complement of high-frequency (monthly or quarterly) 
coincident indicators, specifically, the broad measures of output, income, employment and 
sales.  
While this is hardly a trivial project, it is eminently feasible given a strong official 
commitment. It is not critical that official government bodies should directly collect such 
data. In a country like India, for instance, there is enough private-sector expertise in 
collecting survey data to justify regular surveys of the key coincident indicators –  if 
necessary, subcontracted to the private sector. It is only the collection of such data by a broad 
range of developing economies over a period of several  years that can then lead to the 
development of reliable cycle chronologies, against which one could test the viability of 
robust systems of leading indicators for such economies, which could then be used with 
confidence by policymakers.  
The alternative is to do what economists have long been doing, with consistently poor 
results:  namely,  back-fit econometric models to whatever historical  time series might be 
available, fail to forecast recessions in real time, and repeatedly re-jigger the same models, 
only to see them fail again and again in real time in subsequent economic cycles. This is a 
patently futile approach. As the saying goes, “insanity is doing the same thing over and over 
and expecting a different result”.  
The field of economic forecasting faces formidable challenges in the years ahead. 
Even robust leading indicators can provide only a partial answer. After all, unlike 
econometric models, they are designed to predict only the timing of cyclical turning points, 
not forecasts of the magnitude of economic variables. Nor can they answer “what if” 
questions, which are often central to policy decisions. In other words, a well-designed leading 
indicator  approach should be seen as a complementary tool, but one that is capable of 
providing invaluable guidance in the lead-up to recessions and recoveries, preventing 
decision makers from being blindsided by the inevitable turning points in years to come.  22 
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Figure 5  
Annualized Growth in U.S. Coincident Indicators 
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1953-1955 P 7/53 5/53
T 5/54 6/54
1956-1959 P 8/57 10/56 11/57
T 4/58 2/58 4/59
1960-1961 P 4/60
T 2/61




1969-1973 P 12/69 10/70 10/70
T 11/70 8/71 11/71
1973-1975 P 11/73 8/73 7/74 9/74 4/74 4/74 7/75 8/74
T 3/75 7/75 6/75 8/75 4/75 6/75
1976-1978 P
T 3/76 11/77
1979-1980 P 1/80 1/80 8/79 6/79 5/80 3/80 2/80 2/80
T 7/80 6/80
1981-1983 P 7/81 4/81 3/82 4/82 9/81
T 11/82 11/82 7/83 12/83 10/82 5/81 5/83 11/82 6/83 1/83
1984-1986 P 10/85
T 11/86 12/84 5/84
1987-1988 P 2/87
T 7/87
1989-1991 P 7/90 3/90 8/89 1/91 5/90 11/91 3/90 6/90
T 3/91
1992-1994 P 10/92 2/92 2/92 4/92
T 3/92 10/93 3/92 4/94 8/93 3/92 10/93 12/93 9/93 7/93 6/93
1994-1996 P 11/94 3/95 12/94 5/95
T 7/95 9/95 9/96 3/96
1997-1999 P 10/97
T 4/99
2000-2001 P 3/01 8/00 2/01 1/01 3/01 1/01
T 11/01 12/01 12/01
2002-2003 P 10/02 8/02
T 8/03 6/03 8/03 5/03 3/03
2004-2009 P 12/07 1/08 4/08 8/08 4/08 2/08 5/08 8/07 2/08 5/08 4/08 2/08
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